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Introduction 
 
The Alcohol Improvement Programme (AIP) was a three-year, 
multi-faceted UK Department of Health (DH) initiative developed to 
contribute to the reduction of alcohol-related harm, as measured 
principally by a reduction in the rate of increase in alcohol-related 
hospital admissions (ARHAs) in England. A key component of the 
AIP was the appointment between November 2008 and 
September 2009, of a Regional Alcohol Manager (RAM) in each of 
nine English health regions. This article draws on a commissioned 
evaluation of the RAM function undertaken over a 12-month period 
over 2010-11, to explore how this new role developed and how it 
fits within wider understandings of ‘policy networks’ and ‘governing 
at a distance’. 
 
Policy networks and policy implementation 
Theoretical perspectives on the way in which centrally-determined 
policy is implemented (or otherwise) at the local level have 
developed considerably since Pressman and Wildavsky’s (1973) 
seminal work, Implementation (although some commentators have 
suggested earlier roots: Saetren, 2005). Much of the literature of 
the 1980s and 1990s can be characterised as a debate between 
‘top-down’ perspectives, whereby policy implementation is seen as 
a unidirectional chain from central policy-makers, who formulate 
policy, to local implementers whose responsibility is to implement 
the policy (e.g. Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973); and ‘bottom-up’ 
perspectives which focus on the way in which policy is effectively 
created through the myriad decisions made by ‘street-level 
bureaucrats’ (Lipsky, 1980). Subsequent writers have offered 
analyses that have attempted to draw on both perspectives (e.g. 
Sabatier, 1986; Palumbo and Calistra, 1990).  
 
However, a different approach has increasingly taken centre stage 
in thinking about how policy is developed and implemented: the 
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idea of ‘policy networks’. Underlying this perspective is the 
recognition that there has been a major change in how policy is 
managed and delivered, such that networks have become ‘the 
engine-room of the modern British polity’ (Hudson and Lowe, 
2004). As Kilijn and Koppenjan put it, ‘the nature of tasks that 
governments in contemporary complex societies are confronted 
with will not allow for command and control reactions. Because of 
the ambiguity and complexity of these tasks, governments will 
have to learn to enter into partnerships with other parties’ (Kilijn 
and Koppenjan, 2000, p.154-5). From this viewpoint, policy making 
and implementation occur in networks consisting of a range of 
independent actors, with the success or failure of the policy 
process dependent on the extent of co-operation between these 
actors. In this context, O’Toole et al. (1997) have referred to 
‘implementation networks’ to describe networks of interdependent 
actors ‘involved in the translation of the policy intentions of the 
national political community into appropriate measures or actions 
for the realisations of these objectives at the “level of the 
consumer”’(p.139). While clearly a challenge to the traditional ‘top-
down’ view of central policy enactment, such an approach does 
not render obsolete the role of Government. Kickert and 
colleagues have described how network management operates as 
a ‘weak’ form of steering ‘which tries to influence the strategic 
actions of other actors’ (Kickert et al., 1997, p.167). Governments 
can therefore engage in different types of network management, 
such as network constitution, involving the introduction of new 
actors into a network (Kilijn and Koppenjan, 2000). 
 
A parallel literature has focused more broadly on governance – 
and, in particular the governance of the NHS. Here, commentators 
have described the shift away from a hierarchical ‘command and 
control’ approach towards the use of data, targets, networks and 
markets in order to ‘govern at a distance’ (Rose and Miller, 1992; 
Huges and Griffiths, 1999; Smith, Anell, Busse, Crivelli, Healy, 
Lindahl, Westert and Kene, 2012). In their comparative study of 
health systems operating in seven different countries, Smith et al. 
describe how ‘In a typically complex health system no one actor 
has all the knowledge and power required to get things done and 
the state must therefore necessarily engage in networked 
governance across many organisations’ (Smith et al., 2012, p.38). 
 
The idea of ‘governing at a distance’ stems from an influential 
paper by Rose and Miller (1992). Drawing on Foucault’s concept of 
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‘governmentality’, (Foucault, 1991), Rose and Miller employ the 
phrase ‘technologies of government’ to refer to ‘strategies, 
techniques and procedures through which different forces seek to 
render programmes operable and by means of which a multitude 
of connections are established between the aspirations of 
authorities and the activities of individuals’ (Rose and Miller, 1992, 
p.183). One such technology, central to the nation-state since the 
19th century, has been the collection and use of statistics, which 
Rose and Miller see as an active process, ‘a way of acting upon 
the real…in such a way as to make the domain in question 
susceptible to evaluation, calculation and intervention’ (1992, 
p.185). The collection of data allows governments to define social 
problems and gives legitimacy to policies and programmes 
designed to address these problems. Such data collection can also 
lead to ‘action at a distance’, whereby local agencies (for example 
hospitals), can ‘work out “where they are”, calibrate themselves in 
relation to “where they should be” and devise ways of getting from 
one state to the other’ (Rose and Miller, 1992, p.187). 
 
As Greenaway, Salter and Hart (2007) have pointed out, ‘much of 
the literature on policy networks has been theoretically top-heavy’, 
with a lack of detailed case studies (see also Hudson and Lowe, 
2004). This article aims to explain the structure, role and impact of 
the RAMs within the conceptual frameworks of policy networks and 
government at a distance. In particular it addresses the following 
questions, which structure this article:  
 
• To what extent did the RAM function come about as a result 
of the need for the DH to ‘govern from a distance’? 
• How did the RAMs function as a policy network? What 
potential was there for the RAMs to act as an implementation 
network in terms of impact at a local level? 
• What was the method and impact of network management 
by the DH? 
• What conclusions can be drawn about the RAMs as a 
discrete policy network, their relation to other networks and 
their impact? 
 
Methods 
 
The research reported here is drawn from a wider evaluation of the 
Alcohol Improvement Programme (Thom et al., 2011). Three main 
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components of this evaluation have thrown light on the role of the 
RAMs. 
 
First, in-depth, face-to-face interviews were conducted with each of 
the nine RAMs, lasting between one and two hours. While a topic 
guide was used in these interviews, they were relatively 
unstructured, ensuring a breadth of topic area at this early stage in 
the research (Fontana and Frey, 1994). Topics covered included 
RAMs’ aims and responsibilities, their programmes of work 
(including the High Impact Changes, see below), partnership, 
effectiveness and impact. Meetings of all the RAMs, held in the DH 
in London were also attended and contributed to the research 
team’s understanding of the links between central policy-makers 
and the RAMs. 
 
Second, 31 semi-structured interviews were undertaken with 
regional and local policy contacts identified by the RAMs. These 
interviews were briefer, more structured and mostly undertaken by 
telephone. Topics covered included the local policy context, 
contact with RAMs, High Impact Changes, commissioning 
decisions, impact and legacy. 
 
Third, six, in-depth face-to-face interviews were undertaken with 
national-level policy-makers. The focus of these interviews was on 
the wider policy context, the background and development of the 
AIP, including the RAM role, and the programme’s potential impact 
and legacy.  
 
Analysis focused on the deductively-derived themes covered in the 
topic guides but also more inductively-derived themes, which grow 
out of the fieldwork and analysis (Huberman and Miles, 1994).  
 
The development of the RAM function: Government from a 
distance? 
 
The past 20 years has witnessed an exponential rise in public 
concern about alcohol and policy responses to such concern 
across the countries of the UK (Baggott, 2010: Lloyd, 2010). While 
much of this disquiet has focused on ‘binge drinking’ and public 
disorder, another contributor to public concern has been the 
dramatic rise in alcohol-related hospital admissions (e.g. Mayor, 
2010). Policy responses have been numerous. The Alcohol Harm 
Reduction Strategy for England came out in 2004 (Cabinet Office, 
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2004) and The Licensing Act 2003 came into effect in the following 
year (2005). Safe. Sensible. Social. was published in 2007 
(Department of Health, 2007) and the current, Coalition 
Government’s strategy in March 2012. Another important Labour 
Government policy that has driven national and local policy 
agendas alike over this period was the introduction of a Public 
Service Agreement (PSA) on alcohol and drugs in 2007: PSA 25 
(HM Treasury). Public Service Agreements represented the 
prioritised aims and objectives of UK government departments for 
a three-year period, each including its own targets and delivery 
plan.  
 
The new PSA on alcohol presented the DH with a pressing need to 
ensure that it could deliver on the associated ‘Indicator 2’: the 
number of alcohol-related hospital admissions (ARHAs). However, 
as was clear from interviews with policy-makers, there was limited 
potential for the DH to directly influence the work undertaken on 
the ground by the Primary Care Trusts (PCTs), responsible for 
managing the provision of primary care in England:  
 
Now as part of the PSA we have to develop a delivery plan…with 
that comes a load of challenges…throughout all of this the 
Department’s relationship with the NHS is a lot more hands 
off…But at the end of the day, it’s the PCTs who make the 
decisions about what’s in place [DH policy-maker]. 
 
..we knew from the centre we couldn’t deal with 152 PCTs [DH 
policy-maker]. 
 
A range of indirect approaches was therefore developed, making 
up the Alcohol Improvement Programme (AIP): 
• The Alcohol Learning Centre (ALC) is an online site, providing 
up to date information on alcohol, training packages, forums for 
communication and discussion between groups working on 
alcohol.  
• Seven high impact changes (HICs) were chosen as the most 
effective, evidence- based actions likely to contribute to 
reducing alcohol-related harm. The first three HICs were 
enabling actions intended to facilitate intervention. The 
remaining four HICs were interventions that could be 
commissioned and implemented at local level. 
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• The Alcohol National Support Team (ANST) provided PCTs 
with an intensive four day ‘diagnostic’ visit, resulting in a 
recommended plan of action for implementing the high impact 
changes. 
• Regional Alcohol Managers (RAMs)  
 
The original idea for the RAM role emerged from regular meetings 
held at the Department of Health with Regional Alcohol Leads. 
While the existence of such posts in Regional Public Health 
Departments might suggest that a regional alcohol structure 
already existed, in practice Regional Alcohol Leads had multiple 
responsibilities, some able to devote only a small part of their time 
to alcohol issues. The idea of dedicated, single-issue, regional 
alcohol posts akin to the Regional Tobacco Policy Managers 
(Department of Health, 2008) was therefore developed in these 
meetings between DH policy-makers and the regional leads.  
 
So the programme was developed out of that interaction with the 
regional leads…the regions recognised that for anything to be 
done around this there needs to be some sort of dedicated 
regional coordination, similar to the smoking cessation model… 
[DH policy-maker]. 
 
The impetus for the creation of these new posts clearly came from 
the Regional Leads themselves:  
 
So it was they who said, look we need, like with tobacco, like with 
other subjects, we need to have a regional office [DH policy-
maker] 
 
A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was drawn up between 
the DH and Regional Directors of Public Health outlining the RAM 
function and expectations of it, in terms of making a regional 
contribution to reducing ARHAs. It is clear from the MOU that the 
primary modus operandi of the RAMs was to be one of working in 
partnership and influencing others. While the ARHA targets 
loomed large, the words ‘support’, ‘influence’ and ‘co-ordinate’ 
appear frequently in the MOU. RAMs were therefore tasked with 
using ‘soft’ methods to achieve the ‘hard’ target of reducing 
ARHAs. 
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Reflecting the detached, ‘hands-off’ nature of the DH’s influence, 
there were limitations on the degree to which the RAM role could 
be specified: 
 
…we could dictate to the regions the functions that we wanted to 
be done but we had to leave it to them as to how they wanted to 
carry out those functions [DH policy-maker]. 
 
Consequently while most of the nine RAMs were based in regional 
Government Offices, managed by senior public health managers, 
there was considerable variability in the staffing and working 
environments associated with the role. Some RAMs worked alone 
with no additional staff, while others worked in teams of colleagues 
funded by the AIP. Some were largely peripatetic, spending a lot of 
time visiting local PCTs: others much more office-based.  
 
Thus the development of the RAM role came about as a 
consequence of the recognition of the gulf that lay between DH 
policy and local action, at a time when local action was needed to 
deliver on a national target. The DH had to adopt ‘government 
from a distance’: in the absence of simple, direct levers of power, 
policy-makers were forced to identify a number of indirect ways of 
ensuring that the hard target of reducing ARHAs would be 
achieved. A consequence of this indirect, ‘hands-off’ approach was 
the considerable variety in the nature, location and structure of the 
RAM function across the nine regions. 
 
Another feature of this ‘government from a distance’, was the 
construction of local ARHAs targets as a technology of 
government. One of the policy-makers described the importance of 
these data: 
 
…so work was put in with the North West PHO [Public Health 
Observatory] in developing and refining the local alcohol profiles 
for England. So that produced for each PCT a set of indicators on 
which they could judge how they were doing…[later] So the 
information was given to PCTs, well the PCTs then came 
back…and said ‘what can we do about that? What can we do? [DH 
policy-maker].  
 
The construction of these local data therefore appear to have 
constituted ‘action at a distance’ (Rose and Miller, 1992), allowing 
PCTs to establish how they were performing on ARHAs in 
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comparison to others and pushing some of them in the direction of 
devising plans for interventions. 
 
The HICs also appeared to operate as an effective technology of 
government. 
 
…it’s kind of provided [PCT leads] with a framework for what to do, 
which is brilliant, absolutely brilliant.  It provides an evidence base 
which has been lacking, it provides the structure, the kind of 
coordinated approach and also I suppose in some sense, it 
provides people with something to mark themselves against… 
[RAM].  
 
The HICs provided a common language and structure through 
which RAMs could communicate with local partners. While not 
unchallenged, the description of them as ‘evidence-based’ was 
also a powerful feature contributing to their local adoption. 
 
The RAMs as a policy network 
 
In order to explore how the RAMs’ functioned as a policy network, 
it is necessary to first sketch out how the RAMs made contacts 
with local policy networks and sought to influence them, and what 
were the factors that appeared to influence whether their efforts 
were successful. 
 
Making contact 
The RAMs differed in the degree to which they already had local 
contacts and networks. Some were already engaged in local 
alcohol policy and practice work before taking up the RAM role and 
there was therefore some degree of continuity. However, for 
others, this was a new job in a new area and, for them, there was 
an immediate need to go out to the PCTs in their region and meet 
with PCT alcohol leads, commissioners and other local alcohol 
policy and practice contacts. These visits were partly about starting 
the process of forging relationships with individuals who would be 
vital partners for future work but they were also about starting the 
process of mapping the services and work that was going on. 
 
Vital here was the process of forging good relationships. As had 
always been recognised in the development of the RAM function, 
their modus operandi had to be one of persuasion:  
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…we don’t have any actual power in this role…So it is about - it 
shouldn’t be but it is in a way - about personalities, because it is 
very much about influencing and bringing people together [RAM]. 
 
For some RAMs, it was clear that the die was cast at this early 
stage in terms of the PCTs that they would work with most closely: 
 
I think there are a couple of areas that…haven’t welcomed your 
input as much…I think it’s just that they haven’t got themselves as 
organised and they are therefore not as qualified to have these 
kind of discussions with me.  So they sort of think ‘oh god we don’t 
want her coming because what the hell are we going to say to her’. 
[RAM]. 
 
RAMs were therefore only able to engage effectively with a 
proportion of the existing networks in their regions. To some 
extent, RAMs appeared to ‘go with the grain’: given limited time 
and resources, it was natural and, perhaps, inevitable for RAMs to 
start work with the PCTs and other partners that welcomed their 
input. For example, in one area pharmacists were already keen to 
take forward Identification and Brief Advice (IBA)1 for young 
women wanting emergency contraception. 
 
Pharmacists bit our arms off because they decided that this is what 
we wanted to be doing…they were happy to engage with the 
programme. So they particularly focused on young women coming 
in for the morning after pill and that is a particularly profound 
teachable moment…[RAM]. 
 
Structural factors 
An important factor influencing the RAMs’ engagement was the 
number of Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) in each region, which 
varied between nine and 34. This carried significant implications 
for the extent to which RAMs could visit PCTs and forge close 
working relationships with alcohol leads and other contacts at the 
local level.  
 
Another influential factor was the already existent level of 
communication between PCTs on alcohol issues and the degree to 
which there was a structure to encourage and maintain such 
                                            
1Screening and simple, structured advice which raises awareness around 
harmful drinking patterns and the associated effects, 
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communication. Where levels of communication were poor, RAMs 
brought people together to share analysis of problems and discuss 
possible solutions. Thus in some areas, RAMs were instrumental 
in bringing local PCT alcohol leads and commissioners together at 
the regional level to discuss alcohol policy. RAMs were also 
responsible for developing practitioner networks. For example one 
of the RAM teams brought together alcohol nurse specialists 
working in hospitals in the region: 
 
And basically again we looked across the region and the picture 
was unclear we didn’t know how many we had, we didn’t know 
what they were doing, we didn’t know what support they had 
so…we invited all our core specialist nurses to an event…and 
following that event we’ve created three sub-regional networks, 
two are virtual and one meets now on a regular basis [RAM]. 
 
The degree to which local and regional infrastructures were 
already developed was influenced by the regional and local 
importance attached to alcohol historically. In some areas alcohol 
had already been a key regional policy concern for some time, with 
policy-makers referring to the escalation in public concerns about 
alcohol over the past decade: 
 
We realised about four or five years ago that there was an 
emerging issue that was growing in its impact on life 
expectancy…So we’ve actually been sort of championing the 
agenda around alcohol for some time…[local policy-maker]. 
 
This policy emphasis on alcohol could be related to levels of local 
need, often reflecting long histories of regional drinking cultures 
and associated problems, which had led to more sophisticated 
thinking and responses to the issue. However, at the local level, 
the level of priority given to alcohol also related to the presence or 
absence of individuals who had taken a particular interest in 
alcohol: 
 
…you need both the proven need from a needs assessment and 
then you need someone with the interest or drive or determination 
to take it forward. [RAM] 
 
RAMs’ backgrounds 
RAMs’ backgrounds appear, to some degree, to have affected the 
type of contacts they made and the type of programmes they 
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developed. People with criminal justice backgrounds tended to 
have good contacts within the Home Office sections of 
Government Regional Offices and, at metropolitan and local levels, 
with Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships2. In some cases, 
this led to frustrations with the clear health focus of the AIP and its 
main target of reducing ARHAs. Indeed, as will be described later, 
a number of RAMs found it difficult to ignore the pull of local 
concerns, particularly with regard to young people and with regard 
to criminal justice issues.  
 
A connecting network 
The RAM function was clearly designed to operate in the space 
between policy-makers in the DH and local policy networks. In this 
respect, they were simultaneously part of local networks and yet 
also part of central Government alcohol policy structures. RAMs 
regularly attended meetings at DH headquarters, where they were 
appraised of policy developments and where they also had the 
opportunity to contribute to debates about alcohol policy. RAMs 
were therefore part of a wider policy formation network as one of 
the range of influences acting on DH policy-makers. However, they 
were also embedded in regional and local alcohol policy structures 
and networks, engaging in local policy discussions and seeking to 
influence commissioning decisions. They could therefore be seen 
as acting in some respects as an ‘implementation network’.   
 
A policy implementation network? 
A number of factors appeared to limit the reach and effectiveness 
of the RAMs as a policy implementation network. First, there was a 
limit to what nine small offices could achieve in a maximum of 
three years across the whole country. Many of the RAMs had to be 
selective: they could not cover the large number of PCTs within 
their regions. Moreover, this selectivity was not based solely on 
need: there was a tendency to ‘go with the grain’ and work with 
those partners and networks which welcomed them. Therefore the 
RAMs could only offer an implementation network of partial 
coverage. Second, RAMs did not have the power to ‘implement’ 
policy or practice. They were neither agents of government nor 
street-level bureaucrats but something between the two. They had 
to rely largely on influence and persuasion to try to have an impact 
on local policy. Lastly, the local networking function on which they 
relied for their influence was inevitably shaped by the regional and 
                                            
2
 Local multi-agency groups set up to tackle crime, drugs and anti-social behaviour, since 
replaced by Community Safety Partnerships. 
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local policy contexts in which they worked. At one end, there was a 
sense of continuity, with RAMs picking up structures and 
programmes that were already in place but at the other, some 
RAMs had to start almost from scratch: setting up basic structures, 
identifying contacts and endeavouring to raise the profile of alcohol 
at regional and local level. 
 
Network management: the DH Alcohol Policy Team and the 
RAMs 
 
Relations between the RAMs and the DH Alcohol Policy Team 
were generally described by interviewees as very good. There was 
clearly a high level of contact between the RAMs and DH and the 
policy team was generally described by the RAMs as accessible, 
responsive to emails and other queries, supportive and 
knowledgeable. Some RAMs ascribed their accessibility and ‘nous’ 
to the fact that some key members of staff responsible for 
managing the AIP were seconded into their current roles from 
without the Department of Health:  
 
…they are a good team…they have a good expert knowledge, 
they know their stuff and that is partly because they have been 
drawn from people in the field [RAM].  
 
Perhaps partly as a result, the quarterly meetings between RAMs 
and the DH Policy Team were open and convivial. This was a 
policy model based on ‘two-way traffic’ (Kooiman, 1993, p.4), with 
RAMs contributing to policy discussions. However, as has already 
been noted, frustrations and disagreements did occur around 
central and regional/local policy differences, although RAMs saw 
the problems as resulting from the broader DH agenda, rather than 
blaming individuals in the DH policy team. 
 
Dissonance between central and local agendas 
 
As regional alcohol workers with some grant money and a brief to 
work in partnership, RAMs often saw the need for, or were asked 
to get involved in, work which fell outside their brief. One area that 
was ‘off-bounds’ was lobbying on the price and accessibility of 
alcohol. Some RAMs expressed their frustration with this. 
However, the most significant area where local priorities seemed 
to rub up against national policy was children and young people. 
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The PSA target was limited to adults and RAMs were likewise 
expected to focus solely on those aged 18 years and over. 
 
Some RAMs explicitly avoided working in these areas: 
 
I’ve had to be quite careful not to get drawn into agendas that were 
not part of my work remit… That is not to say that I don’t do things 
with young people…But I can’t be putting my work time into their 
agenda because I have to stick with the adults [RAM]. 
 
However for other RAMs and some policy contacts, the DH Policy 
Team’s opposition to work with young people was a source of 
considerable frustration: 
 
we’ve had the silly situation in this region of the DH alcohol policy 
lead telling us that we shouldn’t spend any of our alcohol 
improvement programme funding on young people because they 
are only looking at alcohol related admissions at age 18 plus. So 
where do they think the 18 and overs are coming from? [local 
policy contact]. 
 
For many RAMS, there was clearly a conflict between what was 
expected of them in terms of regional and local partnerships and 
what was expected of them by the DH. For some, this problem 
seemed to be aggravated to some extent, by their management 
situation: answerable to Public Health managers by line 
management and to the DH for the AIP. On the other side of the 
coin, the DH Policy Team was responsible for the allocation of DH 
funds and, as such, had to ensure as far as possible that they 
were expended on DH policy concerns. This was therefore a 
dilemma and, perhaps, one that could only have been avoided by 
a co-funding arrangement for the AIP across government 
departments. 
 
In general, the connections between the centre and the region 
were particularly strong in the AIP, with evidence of mutual 
respect. An important part of this success appears to have been 
the previous experience of the DH Policy Team, whose specialist 
knowledge of alcohol issues appeared to lend them a high level of 
credibility with the RAMs. An interesting feature of this policy case-
study was the blurring of professional boundaries. Some trusted 
RAMs were particularly influential in policy circles and were invited 
to attend other, higher-level policy meetings within the DH, 
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although always tending to speak with the authority of local 
experience. There was also considerable porosity of the divides 
between the DH policy team and the outside policy world, with 
members of the policy team coming into the DH from local policy, 
voluntary sector or consultancy roles; and members of the team 
moving out into consultancy roles following the end of the 
programme. This alcohol policy network therefore appeared to 
span a number of sectoral and professional divides. 
 
Nonetheless, there were also differences in terms of the pressures 
acting on people, most clearly evidenced by disagreements over 
the focus of regional and local work. The stress from the DH on 
ARHAs was less easy to maintain for the RAMs, who felt that they 
had to take local priorities seriously in order to establish and 
maintain the relationships which would allow them to influence 
local policy networks. 
 
The impact of the RAMs 
The large majority of interviewees spoke positively about the 
impact of the RAM teams. The most common impact referred to 
was the additional capacity that RAMs provided, allowing 
governance structures and interagency groups to function much 
better at the regional level and forging closer links with PCTs. 
Related to the issue of capacity-building, there were also frequent 
references to the importance of having a person at the regional 
level with a single focus on alcohol. Before the arrival of the RAMs, 
the alcohol brief had often been held by someone with multiple 
public health responsibilities and this inevitably limited the work 
that could be done. The RAM posts therefore represented a 
significant increase in time and attention paid to alcohol issues and 
often appeared to lead to a quite dramatic change in what could be 
done on alcohol policy and strategy – particularly when very little 
had been done before. As one respondent put it: 
 
So I’m hoping it will leave a legacy here that yeah we’ve got 
organised.  We certainly weren’t organised [local policy contact]. 
 
While there was not universal agreement, most people subscribed 
to the importance of having a regional capacity on alcohol and the 
importance of the RAM teams in this regard: 
 
For me personally I think that you need someone in a lead position 
to be able to coordinate activity and meetings and groups and be 
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seen as the lead really at a regional level. I think that’s important 
[local policy contact]. 
  
Another vital role was the provision of information: RAMs and RAM 
teams acted as the regional hub or ‘focal point’ for information on 
alcohol, local projects, best practice and contacts. They were also 
seen as important conduits of information on national policy, 
through their regular contact with DH policy-makers. In a field 
where policy has been moving very fast, knowledge and insight 
into central policy thinking was seen as valuable. 
 
With regard to the impact of RAMs on ARHAs, it was impossible to 
ascribe changes in the rate of ARHAs solely to the efforts of 
RAMs. This was due to the large number of factors bearing on the 
ARHA statistics, including drinking rates and variation in data 
collection (Thom et al., 2012): but also because of the multiplicity 
of agents acting on local policy and practice. The RAMs’ work was 
delivered through partnership and influence, and carving out their 
separate impact in a quantitative sense was impossible. 
Nevertheless, especially where grants were also made available, 
there were many instances of RAMs playing a central role in 
introducing HICs both at the regional and local levels. The RAMs 
were often described as having accelerated or extended the 
delivery of interventions: in the words of one interviewee it gave 
‘some oomph’ to these initiatives. 
 
Networks built to last? 
The AIP was a time-limited initiative and funding ceased in 2011. 
Interviewees were asked to consider what would happen when the 
RAMs left their posts. Many saw it likely that alcohol would 
become, once again, just another responsibility among many 
borne by local public health officers. It was also seen as likely to 
involve the grinding to a halt of many of the initiatives that RAMs 
had instigated and, in some regions, the atrophy of a coherent 
regional strategic plan. One specific casualty was thought to be the 
new networks that had been set up or developed by RAMs and 
which were likely to ‘wither on the vine’.  
 
There were also fears about the loss of expertise and close 
contacts that had been built up at the individual level: 
 
When we lose that function, we lose somebody who has formed a 
very close relationship with all the primary care trusts, who knows 
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her stuff, somebody who knows alcohol inside and out, services 
inside and out, who motivates people…[local policy contact]. 
 
There was a widespread frustration with the short-term nature of 
the initiative. It was suggested that drinking, with its roots deep in 
our culture, was unlikely to be significantly impacted by a mere 
three-year initiative.  
 
There was therefore a shared view that what had been gained by 
the programmes was likely to be lost following the departure of the 
RAMs. This was thought to be particularly the case given the 
dramatic changes facing regional and local health policy 
structures, with the forthcoming abolition of the regional offices and 
the new public health role to be played by local authorities in the 
UK (Department of Health, 2012). It seemed likely to such 
respondents that, given these changes, the networks, strategies 
and human capital in terms of knowledge and competence would 
be lost in the general ferment. 
 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
The experience of the RAMs offers an instructive case-study in the 
complexities involved in implementing government policy in a 
contemporary public health context. Central policy imperatives 
concerning hospital admissions needed to find local expression in 
terms of effective interventions. However, in this policy context - as 
in many others - there was little scope for a traditional, top-down 
model of policy implementation: to use Klijn and Koppenjan’s 
phrase, ‘government is actually not the cockpit from which society 
is governed’ (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000, p.136). Instead, the DH 
adopted a number of indirect approaches (government at a 
distance), among them the introduction of the regional network of 
RAMs. A ‘weak’ form of policy steerage was therefore employed to 
target the ‘hard outcome’ of reducing AHRAs. 
 
The term ‘implementation networks’ is problematic in the context of 
the RAMs, mainly because the AIP was not an alcohol policy that 
could simply be ‘implemented’. At the heart of the AIP was the 
more effective delivery of evidence-based approaches in order to 
reduce ARHAs (the HICs). This could not be passed as a piece of 
legislation. Nor was it readily distilled into a single piece of 
guidance such as that produced by the National Institute of Health 
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and Clinical Excellence (NICE) which could be disseminated and 
its implementation inspected. Given structural constraints, and 
limited time and resources, the decision was made to opt for 
government at a distance: the creation of a new network of RAMs 
who were then expected to impact on local decision-making 
through partnership and persuasion. The RAMs were therefore 
more of an influencing network than an implementing network. 
 
The concept of policy networks and the idea of government at a 
distance offer fruitful ways to understand the RAMs and the AIP 
more broadly. Although the initial imperative for policy action was 
forged at a high-level between the DH and the Treasury in the form 
of the PSA, the response to this imperative in the form of the set of 
policies that became the AIP involved a range of influences, 
including those of local policy-makers. From this stage onward, the 
policy process bears the hallmarks of a complex, interactive policy 
network model. The porous nature of the boundaries between this 
central government department and the wider world of local policy 
expertise sits well within the network framework. There was no 
simple policy chain that ran from one clearly defined official to the 
next - from ministers, through civil servants and NHS managers to 
coal-face practitioners. This was a complex, dynamic process, 
involving individuals whose bearings and roles were not 
necessarily fixed. 
 
In some respects the DH and RAMs could be said to constitute a 
single policy network: in terms of a degree of structural continuity 
between the regional and the central policy levels but also in terms 
of sharing a common mission that could not be realised by one 
party and a consequent degree of interdependence. However, 
there was also a clear division between those tasked with the 
central policy brief to deliver on the PSA and those who had to 
juggle central policy directives with local priorities, and this resulted 
in inevitable tensions concerning the work programmes that the 
RAMs developed. Therefore, in this particular policy context there 
were actually three overlapping policy networks: the central 
government policy network, consisting of policy-makers from the 
DH and other government departments; the regional policy 
network, consisting mainly of the RAMs (but also other regional 
policy-makers); and the local policy-networks, consisting of PCT 
leads, commissioners and others. These networks overlapped in 
that some individuals had ambiguous statuses or could move 
between them: some central policy-makers had recently come 
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from the regional or local network level and moved back after the 
AIP; some RAMs found themselves at interdepartmental alcohol 
policy meetings in the heart of the central policy network; and 
some RAMs were adept at joining local networks – a necessary 
precursor to influencing local policy decisions. As the ‘network in 
the middle’, the RAMs had the greatest potential to be pulled in 
different directions but were also the lynchpins in terms of potential 
policy impact. 
 
Lastly, the question should be addressed of whether this act of 
policy network constitution – the institution of the RAMs – was an 
effective policy approach. As has been argued earlier, it is 
impossible to carve out the particular impact of the soft influencing 
skills of the RAMs on the hard outcome of ARHAs. However the 
qualitative evaluation showed how the creation of a single-issue, 
regional alcohol post was able to have a pronounced impact on 
some local policy networks. The short-lived nature of the initiative 
was clearly a problem, in that the development of new networks 
and the credibility needed to influence local policy inevitably takes 
time. Nevertheless the RAMs experiment does seem to show how, 
at least for a historically much-neglected policy area like alcohol, 
the creation of middle-tier, regional networks composed of alcohol 
specialists can impact both on central and local policy networks.  
 
 
 
 
Disclaimer 
 
This is an independent article on an evaluation commissioned and 
funded by the Policy Research Programme in the Department of 
Health. The views expressed are not necessarily those of the 
Department. 
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